Sadly, none of my colleagues has thus far attempted anything more than a superficial analysis of the recent Barack Obama victory and its implications for the battle that the incumbent Government here faces.
Suffice to say, I am entirely uncomfortable with the suggestion that because Obama won as an incumbent in a hostile economic environment, it also means that the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) will win in Barbados.
There are several local peculiarities that distinguish the DLP’s challenges from those the United States Dems faced and while this article will not attempt to speak to all of these, an effort will be made to speak to Obama’s exploitation of the scientific tools available to him.
United States-based analysts have argued that one of Obama’s strengths is that he investigated and established where his voting base existed and, more importantly, explored the characteristics of the uncommitted voter. It is important to know and understand the former group since these are the people one can rely on in good times and bad, but one should also be aware of the limitations of this group.
Regarding the latter, it is also possible to determine what the uncommitted voter is concerned about and what could bring that person over to your side.
The analysis would, however, need to go further and isolate the extent to which an issue is of peculiar concern or can be treated in such a way that would appeal to a particular type of voter, while not deterring others in significant numbers.
The specific treatment of issues is not a simple matter, which was demonstrated clearly in 1999 by the DLP’s Crime And Violence campaign. In this instance, the DLP correctly determined that the crime and violence focus was of great concern to “uncommitted voters” and spoke to this issue. The party did not, however, seem to realize that crime and violence was equally important to committed DLP and Barbados Labour Party (BLP) voters, which meant that it would not necessarily be a focus that could capture votes from this uncommitted group.
In the case of Obama, it is now becoming clear that he spoke to issues like immigration, gay marriage, health care and student loans in a way that clearly caught the fancy of uncommitted voters.
The logic of his position on gay marriage is demonstrative since this was an issue that could excite tentative Republicans, especially those uncomfortable with the idea of voting for a Mormon. At the same time, however, the issue was not one which would have “turned off” his base regardless of what they said initially.
Since the quantities of people who are likely to be affected by gay marriage are relatively few, there is an automatic assumption that Obama risked losing millions of Democratic voters in the interest of a few “gay” voters. The reality is that nothing could be further from the truth since these issues are important to many non-gay persons who see the issue a relevant to their definition of equality.
Obama took similar progressive positions that identified him with students who had borrowed heavily to complete their tertiary education, people who had been denied health care because of a pre-existing condition and adults who had been brought into the country illegally as children and were being threatened with deportation. In all instances the groups that would have been directly impacted were small, but all of them represented groups seen as being marginalised.
Moreover, we can presume that there were significant numbers of “uncommitted voters” who identified with the marginalized status of these persons and believed that America would be a better place if the plight of such persons wasaddressed.
Over the years CADRES has struggled with the scientific identification of “uncommitted voters” largely because of cultural norms which make accurate polling on these issues challenging. As such, respondents often do not answer the political question and give a variety of responses ranging from “Don’t know” to “Not Voting”.
However, post-election reviews of these data have previously demonstrated that the vast majority of people who did not answer the political questions actually did not vote (as distinct from being genuinely uncommitted). As such, CADRES has settled on the “Uncertain Voter” which represents all people who did not answer the political questions, and our analysis and projections based on this group appear to have been reliable thus far.
The CADRES identified “Uncertain Voter” is therefore proximate to what the Americans referred to as an “uncommitted voter” and more recent CADRES reports have spoken to this voter’s views and opinions as a point of specific interest.
it is useful to note that in the case of Barbados now, the “Uncertain Voter” is “more inclined to be a young male who is employed in the public sector”. The phrase “more inclined” is used here, which means that every young male who is employed in the public sector is not an “Uncertain Voter”, but instead that any randomly selected male who fits this profile is more likely to be uncertain.
The identification of such a voter is relatively simple based on poll data. However, the challenge begins when one attempts to disaggregate this voter’s preferences, since his issues and concerns are identical to that of the committed voter, with one notable exception.
This is of course their leadership preference, which is different from that of the committed voters at the national level.
Anecdotally, it would also appear as though this voter is also more inclined to be educated past the post-secondary level and who is not necessarily “poor”, which means the person shares some of the characteristics of the American uncommitted voter.
Against this background it is important that the actions of political actors not be assessed from general perspective, but the specific perspective of groups that are most relevant to the outcome of the election.
In our case, there have been roughly 60 000 people who have habitually voted for both the DLP and BLP in every election since Independence and the Government has changed several times.
This means that elections are won and lost on the basis of the perspective of 30 000 people spread across 30 constituencies. The ultimate winner of the election therefore is the person who can speak most effectively to this select group and not to the committed voter base of both parties which has repeatedly demonstrated its loyalty.
• Peter W. Wickham is a political consultant and a director of Caribbean Development Research Services (CADRES).
